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Certainly patent applicants will be relieved of the expense of
trying to avoid the function of the apparatus obstacle. The expense consisted of designing and presenting to the Patent Office
an additional apparatus which was inherently different from the
one the inventor was trying to patent but utilized the same process.
This was necessary to avoid having the inventor's process claims
rejected as the mere function of the apparatus. But only time will
tell whether Tarczy-Hornocb has satisfied the constitutional objective of granting patents for the benefit of both the inventor
and the public.
STUART

WILLS -

CLASS GIFTS -

A.

LAVEN

ADOPTED CHILDREN

Weitzel v. Weitzel, 16 Ohio Misc. 105, 239 N.E.2d 263
(P. Ct. 1968).
An obvious legislative intent to eradicate petty legal distinctions
between adopted and natural-born children has occasioned a multiplicity of constructional problems in intestate succession and testamentary disposition.' By resolving constructional disputes in succession matters in favor of adopted children, Ohio courts have succeeded in bringing the law of intestacy in line with public policy
and expectation. But as to analogous disputes relating to class
gifts of private testamentary instruments, the courts have been reluctant to allow adoptees to share. A contrary result was recently
pronounced in Weitzel v. Weitzel,2 where the Cuyahoga County
Claims for Programmable Processes, in

COMPUTERS-IN-LAW

INSTITUTE:

CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF SOFTWARE, at B62 (1968).

On November 20, 1968, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals did in fact
uphold a program patent for an analog computer. In re Prater, 159 U.S.P.Q. 583
(C.C.P.A. 1968), rehearing granted, 160 U.S.P.Q. 230 (1969). Another objection
made to allowing patents for computer programs is the unmanageable increase in
paperwork that will flood the Patent Office. Although these are questionable grounds
to refuse a patent, one critic has observed that
In re Tarczy-Hornoch and In re Bekey will also help hold the amount of
paper sent to the Patent Office to a reasonable size....
The Tarczy-Hornoch
and Bekey cases rejecting the doctrine of inherent function of the apparatus . . . provide the basis for succinct and efficient disclosures in software
patent applications of the future. Helpful as this is, it will not alone be the
solution to the problem of the Patent Office being inundated with software
applications and burdened with the need to search mountains of prior art.
Kayton, Patent Protectability of Software: Background and Current Law in
COMPUTERS-IN-LAW INSTITUTE:
WARE, at B48-B49 (1968).

CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF SOFT-
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Probate Court ruled that the gift class grandchildren embraced the
adopted children of testatrix's son.
The action was instituted by Harry G. Weitzel, administrator of
the estate of Lydia Weitzel, in order to resolve the rights of two
adopted children under the decedent's will. The instrument provided for the bequest of all testatrix's property to her "then living
children and grandchildren." Of the four grandchildren who survived Mrs. Weitzel, two had been adopted by one of her two living
children at a time prior to her death, but subsequent to execution
of her will.3 The petition created a problem of construction for
the court since proper devolution of the estate turned upon
whether Mrs. Weitzel had intended to benefit adopted children
pursuant -to her grandchildrenclass designation. In resolving this
issue, the court directed its attention to two constructional presumptions of general acceptance in most jurisdictions, including
Ohio: (1) A testator intends to include his adopted children
within a testamentary class unless a contrary intent is expressed in
the will. (2) The second presumption, the reverse of the first,
states that a donor who is not an adopting parent intends to include only blood relatives within his testamentary class. This second presumption is commonly referred to as the stranger-to-theadoption rule or rule of preclusion. 4 Since Lydia Weitzel was
not an adopting parent,5 the logical presumption would be that
she did not intend that adoptees participate in the distribution of
her estate, but that natural children take to the exclusion of adopted
ones.
The opposite conclusion reached in Weitzel was the result of a
restriction of the stranger-to-the-adoption rule. In reasoning that
the adopted children were entitled to an equal share in the bequest, the probate court held that the rule of preclusion applied
only to adoptions which had occured after a donor's death, not as
here, where they had occured before it.6 As a last resort, the
Weitzel court recommended that the construction of a line of recent decisions in North Carolina be adopted as the rule of law for
I For an excellent discussion of the problems involved and recommended solutions,
see Halbach, The Rights of Adopted Children Under Class Gifts, 50 IowA L REv. 971

(1965).
2 16 Ohio Misc. 105, 239 N.E.2d 263 (P. Ct. 1968).

3 Id. at 106, 239 N.E.2d at 265.
4 See, e.g., cases cited in Annor., 86 A.L.R.2d 12 (1962).

5 There is no provision for the adoption of grandchildren in Ohio. Third Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. v. Davidson, 157 Ohio St. 355, 362, 105 N.E.2d 573, 577 (1952).
6

See text accompanying note 3 supra.
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Ohio courts: Evidence of a donor's knowledge and approval of
the adoptions and of his physical and mental ability to change his
will for the purpose of excluding adoptees is sufficient to rebut the
presumption that he intended only to favor consanguinious off7
spring.
Denouncing strict application of the stranger-to-the-adoption
rule, the Weitzel decision questioned continued adherence to a
principle that no longer serves as a meaningful tool in ascertaining
donative intent. According to one commentator cited by the court,
the vitality of the rule rests upon a "pre-existing tendency to favor
blood relatives in succession matters, including the construction of
wills . . .accompanied by a common failure of adoption acts to deal

adequately with the effects of adoption."'8 This is not the case today. In Ohio, the adoption statute currently in force affords the
adopted child the same status and legal consequences as a natural
child, "[f]or all purposes under the laws . . . including without
limitation all laws and wills governing inheritance." 9 The Weitzel
court purported that even a cursory reading of the recent adoption
statutes indicated a liberal legislative intent to expand the inheritance rights of adoptees. 10
This is not to say that progressive adoption statutes compel the
conclusion that adopted children share in third party class gifts.
As the Weitzel court conceded, Ohio courts traditionally have resisted a liberal interpretation of the statutes. With few exceptions,
they persistently have regarded the intent of the testator as controlling." Concurrent with early restrictive judicial interpretations
7 16 Ohio Misc. at 115, 239 N.E.2d at 270. The source of the North Carolina
rule is Bradford v. Johnson, 237 N.C. 572, 75 S.E.2d 632 (1953). See also Bullock
v. Bullock, 251 N.C. 559, 111 S.E.2d 837 (1960); Smyth v. McKissick, 222 N.C. 644,
24 S.E.2d 621 (1943); Mooney v. Tolles, 111 Conn. 1, 149 A. 515 (1930). Contra,
Peck v. Green, 266 Ala. 321, 96 So.2d 169 (1956); Trowbridge v. Trowbridge, 127
Conn. 469, 17 A.2d 517 (1941).
8 Halbach, supra note 1, at 973.
9 OHIo REV. CODE § 3107.13 (Page Supp. 1968).
Currently, an adopted child
may inherit through as well as from his adoptive parents, whether the property involved passes by will or by operation of law. See Flynn v. Bredbeck, 147 Ohio St. 49,
68 N.E.2d 75 (1946) (the Ohio anti-lapse statute is in pari materia with the adoption
statute favoring adopted children as a matter of public policy).
10 16 Ohio Misc. at 108-09, 239 N.E.2d at 266-67.

11 See cases cited in 56 OHIO JUR. 2D Adopted Children §§ 617, 622 (1963). Ohio
courts have regarded legislative policy controlling only when (1) a third party decedent has died intestate, see, e.g., Everhard v. Brown, 75 Ohio App. 451, 62 N.E.2d
901 (1945); (2) if testate, only when by use of the terms, heir, heir at law, or next of
kin a donor has impliedly incorporated interpretations of the law of intestacy into his
will, see, e.g., Tiedtke v. Tiedtke, 91 Ohio App. 442, 108 N.E.2d 578 (1951); (3) when
a legatee has predeceased the testator with issue surviving him thus call the anti-
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of adoption legislation, 12 Ohio courts rigidly applied the strangerto-the-adoption presumption as a rule of thumb for determining
donative intent. Albright v. Albright" was the earliest of the decisions which alluded to the rule. In that case the Supreme Court
of Ohio reasoned that class words were to be interpreted in their
"primary and ordinary sense," and that a donor ordinarily contemplated blood relatives when he used the word child, especially
when he was referring to the child of another, rather than his
own.'" But the Weitzel court narrowly confined the Albright decision to its facts, noting that the children precluded in the latter
case were adopted after the death of the transferor; in the Weitzel
case the children were adopted during testatrix's lifetime.' 5
The Weitzel court mistakenly suggested that the case of children adopted between execution of the gift instrument and death
of the donor was one of first impression in Ohio. Substantially
the same question had been litigated in Rodgers v. Miller,'" a 1932
appellate court decision. Employing the rule of preclusion, the
court in Rodgers held that adopted children were not entitled to
take under a trust instrument by which children of the settlor's offspring were to share in the corpus and income of his estate. Especially crucial to the reasoning in Weitzel was the refusal of the
Rodgers court to consider established evidence that the transferor
referred to the adopted children as his grandchildren and "otherwise acknowledged and approved of them as such."'1 7 The county
probate court decision in Weitzel, therefore, appears in contradiction to that of the appellate court in Rodgers.
At best, the oversight by the Weitzel court is minor, since it is
probable that the Rodgers decision is no longer valid on account of
lapse statute into play, see, e.g., In re Estate of Friedman, 86 Ohio App. 97, 88

N.E.2d 230 (1949), rev'd on other grounds, 157 Ohio St. 1, 93 N.E.2d 273 (1950).
12 Early court decisions circumscribed the scope of the adoption statutes to the relations of parent and child and the laws of intestate succession, instead of private
third party testamentary instruments. See, e.g., Albright v. Albright, 116 Ohio St. 668,
157 N.E. 760 (1927).
'3 116 Ohio St. 668, 157 N.E. 760 (1927).
'4 Id. at 679-80, 157 N.E. at 763-64.
15In the majority of other jurisdictions the occurrence of adoptions after the
donor's death is indicative that he did not intend them to be the objects of his bounty.
It is equally dear that children adopted before execution of the donative instrument
will be included within a specified class. See cases cited in Annor., 86 A.L.R.2d 12,
§ 7 (1962). It is uncertain, however, whether children adopted subsequent to execution of the will but prior to the donor's death, as in Weitzel, are entitled to take. See
cases cited in note 7 supra.
16 43 Ohio App. 198, 182 N.E. 654 (1932).
17Id. at 203, 182 N.E. at 656.
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its heavy reliance upon the stranger-to-the-adoption rule that originated long before the liberal adoption statutes were enacted.'" It
is not important whether the adoption statutes are controlling in
the construction of donative instruments. What is important is
that the enactments reflect the general expectations of the public
and, hence, the probable intention of transferors 9
Third National Bank and Trust Co. v. Davidson,0 the most recent of the relevant decisions preceding Weitzel, recognized the
propriety of considering legislative policy in the ascertainment of
donative intent. While the outcome of the Davidson decision was
to preclude after-adopted children, the court paid little more than
lip-service to the stranger-to-the-adoption rule, relying instead upon
a finding of specific intent.2 This same attempt by courts to supplement the rule by calling attention to specific indications of intent is noticeable in other jurisdictions. 2 Moreover, some courts
have resorted to strained interpretations of the facts in order to
establish an intent contrary to the presumption underlying the
rule.2" Finally, three jurisdictions - California, Minnesota, and
New Jersey - have essentially reversed the presumption against
24
adopted children.
18 The court in Rodgers noted that it might have reached a different conclusion
if the Albright decision and the original 1921 Adoption Statute (instead of the statute
as it was amended in 1932) were not binding upon it. Id. at 211, 182 N.E. at 659.
The statute as it read in 1921 made no reference to private testamentary instruments.
OHio GEN. CODE § 8030 (1921), as amended, OHIO GEN. CODE §§ 10512-19 (1932).
Note the text of the 1932 amendment:
but [such child] shall be capable of inheriting property expressly limited by
will or by operation of law to the child or children, heir or heirs at law, or
next of kin, of the adopting parent or parents, or to a class including any of
the foregoing. Id. §§ 10512-19 (emphasis added).
Further, both Albright and Rodgers rested in part upon the proposition that an adopted
child may inherit from, but not through, his adoptive parents - a proposition which
subsequently was overruled in Flynn v. Bredbeck, 147 Ohio St. 49, 68 N.E.2d 75
(1946).
'9 See, e.g., In re Estate of Coe, 42 N.J. 485,201 A.2d 571 (1964).
20 157 Ohio St. 355, 105 N.E.2d 573 (1952).
21 The adopted children were precluded from a class entitled grandchildren born
prior or subsequent to the settlor's death. Drawing particular attention to the terminology modifying the class designation, the court observed that an adopted child
could not be born a grandchild of the deceased at any time. Id. at 363-64, 105 N.E.
2d at 577.
22 See cases cited in Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 12, § 6 (1962).
23
See, e.g., Hoder v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 135 Mont. 27, 336 P.2d 701
(1959) (apparent approval of the notion of adoption was evidence to support a conclusion that donor intended to include adopted children).
24 See In re Estate of Stanford, 49 Cal. 2d 120, 315 P.2d 681 (1957) (reasoning
that children adopted after the death of the testatrix were intended to share in the bequest considering evidence of the donor's knowledge of the effects of adoptions and the
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The judiciary should welcome justified restriction, if not reversal, of the rule of preclusion. 25 In most cases it is safe to assume that a donor either has failed to anticipate the contingency
of future adoptions or has unwittingly failed to express his intention regarding them. In either case the point of dispute should
be resolved by a reasonable endeavor to approximate the probable
inclinations of transferors. The pre-conceived notion that third
party donors favor their own blood relatives is "merely to state a
conclusion and not a reason for it."2 6
One recurrent justification of the preclusionary rule has been
that the donor could not have had adopted children in mind due
to their absence at the time of drafting the testamentary instrument.
The conclusion, while correct, does not serve a rational
justification for precluding adoptees. Had the transferor anticipated future adoptions he probably would not have left the question of their inclusion unanswered. More importantly, it is precisely for the reason that a donor does not know who all the takers
of his estate will be that he employs the class testamentary de2
vice, as opposed to naming specific individuals as donees 8
Nor is it likely that a transferor has consciously expressed any
preference for or against adopted children by his choice of words.
What is more reasonable is that he either has chosen words of art
with no intent whatsoever, or has chosen his particular words and
29
phrases to accomplish a different and distinct purpose.
The chief fault of the stranger-to-the-adoption rule is that it
state's policy to accord to adopted children the same status as natural children); In re
Patrick's Will, 259 Minn. 193, 106 N.W.2d 888 (1960) (citing a statute to the effect that an adoptee has the same rights to inheritance as a natural child and holding
that children, issue, and descendants are presumed to include both biological offspring
and adopted children); In re Estate of Coe, 42 N.J. 485, 201 A.2d 571 (1964). See
also note 30 infra.
25
The Weitzel decision strongly recommends complete reversal of the rule of preclusion. 16 Ohio Misc. at 115, 239 N.E.2d at 270.
26
Halbach, supra note 1, at 987.
27
See, e.g., Rodgers v. Miller, 43 Ohio App. 198, 182 N.E. 654 (1932).
28
An illustration may serve as an explanation: A wishes to devise Blackacre to his
son upon his death for a term of 25 years, then to his grandchildren living at the expiration of the son's term. A intends that his class be subject to fluctuation in number from the time of drafting, presumably because he has employed a class capable of
fluctuation. He has manifested an intent to benefit all his grandchildren living at
the expiration of the son's term, including those who might come into existence after
execution of the will, for that matter up until 25 years after his death. He could not
accomplish that end by naming specific individuals. See T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL,
PREFACE To ESTATES IN LAND AND FuTuRt INTEESTs 138-39 (1966).
29
Note, however, that the heirs of the body limitation has been preserved by the
1968 Adoption Statute for express preclusion of adopted children from a class gift.
OHio REV. CODE § 3107.13 (Page Supp. 1968).
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dangerously defeats intention.3" The hazard is especially acute
when the rule is applied to frustrate the inheritance rights of children adopted during the lifetime of the transferor and with his
knowledge and approval. It is at odds with adoption enactments
in most states which prescribe that adopted and natural-born children be treated alike.31 To disregard legislative policy is to ignore
the only social barometer available for gauging likely donative
intent regarding adoptees.
For estate planners the problem of carrying out the transferor's
intent requires no more than clearly expressing that adopted children be included in or excluded from the specified class. 2 If the
problem has not been avoided at the drafting stage, then the case
may turn upon the time the adoption proceedings took place.33
Evidence of a transferor's proclivity to accept adopted children into
the family undoubtedly will have the effect of weakening the presumption against adoptees.3 4 Secondly, the words, phrases, and
modifying terms that a donor uses to define the class of intended
donees are significant. Some expressions have been held more
likely than others to denote blood relationship. Child, children,
grandchildren, issue and sister are less favorable than heirs and
heirs at law but more favorable than issue of the body. 5 Hereafter
born or born subsequently to terminology modifying a class have
See, e.g., In -reEstate of Coe, 42 N.J. 485,201 A.2d 571 (1964):
We cannot believe it probable that strangers to the adoption could differentiate between the natural child and the adopted child of another. Rather
we believe it more likely that they accept the relationships established by
the parent whether the bond be natural or by adoption and seek to advance
those relationships precisely as that parent would ....
We ought not impute to others instincts contrary to our own. Id. at 492, 201 A.2d at 575,
cited in 16 Ohio Misc. at 111-12, 239 N.E.2d at 268 (citations omitted).
31 The Ohio statute goes beyond simply treating natural and adopted children alike
but by broad language makes the adopted child the natural child of his adoptive
parents. OHIO REV. CODE § 3107.13 (Page Supp. 1968).
32 For some purposes this expression may not be sufficient. A testator may desire
to include within his class only those children adopted in their early youth and reared
by their adoptive parents. If so, a stipulation to that effect should be expressed in the
instrument. Further, a specification of age limit would serve to prevent a dilution
of the bequest by wholesale adult adoptions.
33
See note 15 supra & accompanying text.
34 See cases cited in note 7 supra. An intent of the transferor to include adopted
children has also been inferred from evidence of his knowledge and belief that the
adopting parents could not have natural children. See, e.g., In re Estate of Breese,
7 Wis. 2d 422, 96 N.W.2d 712 (1959). The admissibility of evidence outside the
four corners of the instrument usually rests upon whether the court considers the
class terms stipulated as ambiguous. See, e.g., Central Trust Co. v. Hart, 82 Ohio
App. 450, 80 N.E.2d 920 (1948).
35 See cases cited in Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 12, §§ 13-19 (1962).
30
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usually been held to indicate an intention to exclude adopted children.30 As the Weitzel decision and others consistent with it lead
to the restriction and subsequent reversal of the outdated strangerto-the-adoption rule, -recourse to deceptive constructions that have
been used to justify -the application of the rule eventually will and
should disappear .3
Whether the Weitzel holding (to include, within a testamentary class, children adopted after execution of the will but before
decease of the testator) may be extended to govern adoptions occuring after the death of a -donor depends upon the courts' willingness to reverse the presumption against adoptees. Taking into
account the operation of the class testamentary device, it should
make no difference when the children were adopted. A transferor,
who provides for a postponed class gift to vest after some designated lapse of time following his decease, normally expects that the
number of doneees might increase or decrease up to the time of
distribution."'
It can no longer be said that third party donors discriminate
between biological and adopted children. The Weitzel rationale
is really nothing more than a recognition of the fact that societal
demands today are essentially different from the demands of the
1920's. Judicial rethinking takes time, but with the emergence of
several recent decisions"' accompanied by strong legislative policy,
courts are no longer constrained to follow the inequitable and
archaic stranger-to-the-adoption rule. They may now turn with
some hope of success toward creating a rule of construction that
will more closely approximate the actual intent of the deceased.
WILLIAM
3

L. IAVEMANN

6See note 21 supra.
See note 29 supra & accompanying text.
38 See illustration in note 28 supra. One objection to inclusion of after-adopted
children has been the possibility of allowing one to create heirs for another without
his knowledge and approval. Of course the same result may obtain by natural birth,
but the argument continues: To permit adoption to defeat a gift over upon the demise of an adoptive parent who otherwise would be without heirs, could invite fraud.
See, e.g., In re Estate of Coe, 42 N.J. 485, 201 A.2d 571 (1964). But the prospect
certainly did not trouble the Ohio legislature when it provided that the adopted child
was the lineal descendant of his adoptive parents, thereby allowing that child to inherit under the above situation anyway. See, e.g., In re Estate of Friedman, 86 Ohio
App. 97, 88 N.E.2d 230 (1949) (holding that the statute puts the adopted child in a
direct line of ancestry as if fully born to the adopting parents). Regardless, the contingency of wholesale adoptions either to dilute a bequest or prevent a gift over upon
the death of the adopting parents seems remote considering the vast responsibilities of
parenthood. On the other hand, courts may be loath to favor the inclusion of adult
adoptions to which virtually no parental responsibility attaches.
39 See cases cited in notes 7 & 24 supra.
37

